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COSTS OF PRETRIAL DETENTION 
 
 
Shima Baradaran Baughman∗ 
 
 
Spending on U.S. incarceration has increased dramatically over the last 
several decades. Much of this cost is on incarcerating pretrial detainees—
inmates not convicted of a crime—which constitute the majority of 
individuals in our nation’s jails. Current statutory schemes give judges 
almost complete discretion to order pretrial detention based on unexplained 
or unidentified factors. With this discretion, judges tend to make 
inconsistent decisions in every jurisdiction, some releasing almost all 
defendants—including the most dangerous—and others detaining most 
defendants—even those who are safe to release. There are constitutional 
and moral reasons to evaluate our current detention scheme, but even the 
fiscal impact of pretrial detention alone calls for an empirical analysis. 
Although legal scholarship has applied cost-benefit analysis to other areas 
of criminal law, this Article is the first attempt at conducting such analysis 
in the pretrial arena. This Article compares the risk posed by each 
defendant and the cost of any crimes they may potentially commit while 
released with the costs incurred by detaining these defendants. The results 
show that relying on the cost-benefit model provided here, judges could 
bring significant savings—approximately $78 Billion, increased safety, and 
potentially more equitable pretrial detention decisions. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the past few decades, the amount of money expended on the 
administration of the criminal justice system has skyrocketed.1 In particular, 
                                                
∗ Professor of Law, University of Utah College of Law. The author appreciates work 
on this article by James Parry Sanders, Alexandra Mareshcal, and Alexander Williams.  I 
am also thankful to Frank McIntyre for the underlying econometric work relied on in this 
article. 
1 William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
781, 783–84 (2006) (stating that “[s]pending on the adjudication process has risen a great 
deal” in the “past generation”).  
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2757251 
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spending on prisons has increased dramatically.2 According to one study, 
spending on corrections from 1971 to 2002 rose 455%, adjusted for 
inflation.3 Institutions of higher learning and prisons compete for limited 
state funds, and prisons often win.4 In California, for instance, 10% of the 
state general fund went to higher education and 3% went to prisons thirty 
years ago, today 11% goes to prisons and 7.5% to higher education;5 per-
inmate spending in the state is $48,214, compared with per-student 
spending of $7,463.6  And overall, this nation spends an estimated $80 
billion per year on incarceration. 
However, not all of the incarceration costs are for prisoners. Rather, 
much of it goes toward housing pretrial detainees—individuals held without 
bail based on some perceived level of dangerousness or flight risk—who 
now make up the majority of detainees nationwide.7 Historically, many 
inmates enjoyed the constitutional right to release before trial.8 But as the 
law has evolved in this area, judges have been charged with deciding which 
defendants can be safely released and which should be held in jail before 
trial.9 The current balancing process that judges use to make pretrial release 
and detention decisions is full of individual biases and ad-hoc heuristics that 
                                                
2 Shima Baradaran & Frank McIntyre, Predicting Violence. 90 TEX. L. REV. 497, 551 
(2012). 
3 Stuntz, supra note 1, at 784 n. 12 (“From 1972 to 2001, spending on corrections rose 
455% in constant dollars.”).  
4 David Browdin, How High Prison Costs Slash Education and Hurt the Economy, 
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May 24, 2012, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/ 
economic-intelligence/2012/05/24/how-high-prison-costs-slash-education-and-hurt-the-
economy (“With state revenues under pressure and prison budgets off-limits, funds for 
higher education have been slashed.”).  
5 Id. (“Thirty years ago, 10 percent of the general fund went to higher education and 
only 3 percent went to prisons. Today, almost 11 percent goes to prisons and only 7.5 
percent goes to higher education.”).  
6 Brian Resnick, Chart: One Year of Prison Costs More Than One Year at Princeton, 
THE ATLANTIC, Nov. 1, 2011, http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/11/chart-
one-year-of-prison-costs-more-than-one-year-at-princeton/247629 (comparing spending on 
prisons vs. spending on higher education in New Jersey).  
7 Shima Baradaran & Frank McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 497, 551 
(2012) (“In 1990, the percentage of pretrial detainees was about 50%, but in 2007, the 
pretrial detainee population increased to 62% of the jail population.”). 
8 Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO ST. L. J. 723, 
768–69 (2011). 
9 Baradaran, supra note 7, at 499 (discussing the types of selectivity bias inherent in 
the pretrial risk assessment performed by judges).  
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make these decisions unpredictable. 10  This is evidenced by the 
inconsistency in pretrial release rates across counties in the United States––
some judges release less than 5% of defendants, whereas others release 
more than 90% of defendants charged with exactly the same types of crimes 
in similar neighborhoods.11 The amount spent on pretrial detention—and 
the inconsistent decisionmaking processes from which those costs stem—
require consideration.  
In this Article, I explore the potential value of a cost-based method of 
pretrial detention decisionmaking. In its simplest form, cost-benefit analysis 
is a means of converting the losses and gains of two different courses of 
action into quantifiable dollar terms and aggregating to determine total 
gains and losses to society.12 It is an examination of the factors that weigh 
in favor of or against choosing between the two courses of action—with the 
end goal of deciding which course, as a matter of policy, will garner the 
greatest net benefit.13 Relying on my own research and on data aggregated 
from prior studies, I first quantify the total costs and benefits—both 
financial and social—of pretrial detention of those accused of various 
crimes, and then compare those to the costs and benefits of pretrial release. 
Next, with the understanding that it is likely unrealistic to achieve the 
optimum pretrial detention policy (detaining only those individuals for 
whom detention produces a net benefit to society), I use this same data to 
identify characteristics of felony criminal defendants that most accurately 
predict whether a judge should detain or release a particular defendant 
pretrial. I ultimately find that with violent crime, economic savings are 
greatest when a relatively low number of defendants—those statistically 
most likely to pose a danger to society—are detained pretrial. I further find 
that adopting such an approach could yield a savings of $78 billion as 
compared to the current approach of leaving it up to the subjective 
evaluation of judges. At a minimum, I suggest that federal and state courts 
should consider a cost-benefit approach to pretrial detention 
                                                
10 Id. at 525–26 (“Congress and state legislatures charged judges with the task of 
predicting who could be safely released and who should be held in jail before trial.”). 
11 Id. at 540, fig. 5 (showing the percentage of jurisdictions–counties in a given year–
that have the given release rate for pretrial detainees). 
12 See MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS 2, 12–18 (2006) (discussing the cost-benefit analysis concept in detail).  
13 See David L. Weimer & Aidan R. Vining, Assessing the Costs and Benefits of 
Social Policies, in INVESTING IN THE DISADVANTAGED 2 (David L. Weimer & Aidan R. 
Vining, ed., 2009) (stating that cost-benefit analysis “provides a framework for 
comprehensively taking account of a full range of social benefits and costs” and is a tool 
for suggesting new policy as well as changes to existing policy).  
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decisionmaking as they seek out ways to increase efficiency in the criminal 
justice system and reduce budget expenditures overall. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I lays out the costs inherent in the 
decision to either detain or release a defendant pretrial. Part II presents the 
empirical model used to determine the net costs and benefits of both pretrial 
detention and release and then determines the factors most predictive of cost 
savings to society. Part III offers critiques and limitations of the 
methodology. And the final section explains that if judges considered the 
risk of pretrial violent crime, they could release more people pretrial with a 
substantial savings in costs nationwide. It concludes that a cost-benefit 
analysis of pretrial detention reveals that if judges nationally followed the 
model described here, they could save approximately $78 Billion and 
release individuals who pose less of a risk to society. 
 
I.  COSTS OF PRETRIAL DETENTION AND RELEASE  
 
An important consideration in pretrial detention or release is the costs 
and benefits—economic and social—that result in these decisions. When a 
judge chooses to detain an individual, that individual bears direct costs and 
inconvenience associated with detention.14 The detainee’s family, employer, 
government, and the detention center bear costs as well (societal costs).15 
Conversely, when a judge chooses to release a defendant prior to trial, she 
subjects the public to costs with that release—primarily in the form of 
defendants who may commit further crimes.16 In this Part, I enumerate the 
various costs that warrant consideration in the cost-benefit analysis. This 
explanatory section is not intended to be inclusive. Rather, the costs noted 
are intended to be indicative of the types of costs that appear in the cost-
benefit analysis that follows in Section II. 
 
                                                
14 Thomas Bak, Pretrial Release Behavior of Defendants Whom the U.S. Attorney 
Wished to Detain, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 45, 65 (2002) (discussing the types of losses a 
pretrial detainee will incur while incarcerated).  
15 See JAMES J. STEPHAN, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, STATE PRISON EXPENDITURES, 
2001, at 1–9 (2004) (detailing state expenditures on prison inmates); see NATIONAL 
HEALTHY MARRIAGE RESOURCE CENTER, INCARCERATION AND FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS: 
A FACT SHEET (2010) (discussing the negative consequences of incarceration on family 
relationships).  
16 See TED R. MILLER, MARK A. COHEN, AND BRIAN WIERSEMA, U.S. DEPARTMENT 
OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, VICTIM COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES: A NEW 
LOOK 9–17 (1996) (discussing the tangible and intangible losses incurred by victims of 
crime).  
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A.  Costs of Pretrial Detention 
 
1.  Costs to Detainees 
 
Pretrial detention imposes direct economic costs on detainees. A 
detainee’s inability to work causes the loss of income and, potentially, the 
loss of employment and property.17 If pretrial detainees lose employment, 
they often simultaneously encounter reduced wages if and when they find 
new employment, as serving time reduces hourly wages for men by 
approximately 11%, annual employment by nine weeks, and annual 
earnings by 40%.18 Furthermore, when property (either apartments or rented 
homes) is lost, as occurs in 23% of cases,19 extra funds are expended on a 
subsequent housing search. In addition, one-third of detainees report having 
their property stolen upon detention and thereafter,20 which amounts to 
about $370 per incident of larceny.21 
In addition to direct economic costs, detention imposes significant yet 
difficult-to-quantify costs on individuals including those associated with the 
loss of liberty, dignity, damaged reputation and standing in the 
community, 22  and disruptions to family life and other relationships. 23 
                                                
17 Bak, supra note 14, at 65 (“The price to the defendant of pretrial incarceration is 
clearly his or her loss of freedom, loss of income from work which can no longer be 
performed.”).  
18 PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, COLLATERAL COSTS: INCARCERATION’S EFFECT ON 
ECONOMIC MOBILITY 11, 2010, http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/ 
pcs_assets/2010/collateralcosts1pdf.pdf (“When age, education, school enrollment, region 
of residence and urban residence are statistically accounted for, past incarceration reduced 
subsequent wages by 11 percent, cut annual employment by nine weeks and reduced yearly 
earnings by 40 percent.”).  
19 Mark Pogrebin, Mary Dodge, & Paul Katsampes, The Collateral Costs of Short-
Term Jail Incarceration: The Long-Term Social and Economic Disruptions, 5 
CORRECTIONS MANAGEMENT QUARTERLY 64-65 (2001).  
20  See Ian O’Donnell, Prisons and Penal Purpose: Measuring ‘Performance’ in 
English Jails, 8 Crim. L. F. 111, 118 (1997) (book review) (stating that one in three 
inmates had been threatened or had property stolen).  
21 TED R. MILLER, MARK A. COHEN, AND BRIAN WIERSEMA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, VICTIM COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES: A NEW 
LOOK 9, tbl.2 (1996) (indicating the dollar costs associated with various incidents that 
occur in prisons).  
22 Pogrebin, et al., supra note 19.  
23 See NATIONAL HEALTHY MARRIAGE RESOURCE CENTER, INCARCERATION AND 
FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS: A FACT SHEET (2010) (presenting research on the factors that 
strain family relationships when one partner is incarcerated).  
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Detainees are often victims of humiliation, rape,24 and other violent acts 
while incarcerated, and also suffer added anxiety, stress, and a lower quality 
of life as a result.25 All told, the value of lost freedom to pretrial detainees 
may be as high as $6,770 for the least dangerous defendants.26   
 
2.  Costs to Society 
 
Society’s highest direct cost associated with pretrial detention is the cost 
of imprisonment, including facilities maintenance, prison staff and 
administration officials, meals, rehabilitation and education programs, etc. 
One study has estimated that the annual cost to detain one inmate is 
$22,650,27 although individual states, most notably California, spend more 
than twice as much on imprisonment.28 Other monetary costs to society 
include a reduction in GDP from wages that the defendant would have 
otherwise earned29 as well as lost tax revenue.30 Society also bears the 
                                                
24 See ALLEN J. BECK, PAIGE M. HARRISON, MARCUS BERZOFSKY, RACHEL CASPAR, 
& CHRISTOPHER KREBS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SEXUAL VICTIMIZATION IN 
PRISONS AND JAILS REPORTED BY INMATES, 2008-09, at 7-8 (2010) http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/ 
content/pub/pdf/svpjri0809.pdf (reporting sexual victimization in prisons from inmate 
surveys in 2008 to 2009). 
25 Pogrebin, et al., supra note19, at 69; see Katherine Nesbitt, Preventative Detention 
of Terrorist Suspects in Australia and the United States: A Comparative Constitutional 
Analysis, 17 B. U. PUB. INT. L. J. 39, 39-98 (2007) (examining the intrusion of preventative 
detention in the United States on personal liberties); Miller, supra note 20 (researchers 
have estimated the monetary cost of each rape to be $87,000).  
26 David S. Abrams & Chris Rohlfs, Optimal Bail and the Value of Freedom: 
Evidence from the Philadelphia Bail Experiment, 49 ECON. INQUIRY 750, 751 (2011) (To 
calculate the value to defendants of lost freedom, Abrams & Rohlfs applied the concept of 
revealed preference to defendants’ bail-posting decisions; that is, when a defendant posts 
bail at a certain amount, the researchers implicitly assume that the benefits of freedom 
exceed the cost of posting that amount, and assign a value accordingly. The same 
researchers also estimate that the typical defendant is willing to pay $1,000 for ninety days 
of freedom.).  
27 STEPHAN, supra note 15, at 2.  
28 Resnick, supra note 6.  
29 Douglas L. Colbert, Ray Paternoster, & Shawn Bushway, Do Attorneys Really 
Matter? The Empirical and Legal Cause for the Right to Counsel at Bail, 23 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1719, 1763 (2002) (“During pretrial incarceration, detainee’s loss of freedom results 
in many losing jobs and homes. Taxpayers are left to pay the rising costs of detention, 
while absorbing the social and financial impact of newly dislocated family members.”); See 
generally Albert W. Alschuler, Preventative Pretrial Detention and the Failure of Interest-
Balancing Approaches to Due Process, 85 MICH. L. REV. 510, 517 (1986) (“The jobs of 
detained defendants frequently disappear, and friendships and family relationships are 
disrupted.”).  
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expenses incurred to administer court proceedings and the cost of providing 
counsel for indigent defendants.31  
There are also indirect costs to society associated with pretrial detention. 
For example, because pretrial detention often deprives the detainees’ 
children of financial and emotional support,32 these children are much more 
likely to develop anti-social behaviors and engage in future criminal activity 
themselves.33 They are likewise significantly more likely to drop out of 
school, at a long-term cost of at least $260,000 per child.34 And given that 
these children are more likely to receive public assistance, cost shifting is 
further enhanced.35 
Pretrial detention also carries more indefinite, less-easily quantifiable 
costs. Although it may be difficult to monetize the impact of costs like 
unexplained pretrial detention decisions on the presumption of innocence,36 
it would appear that these costs nonetheless belong in the analysis. 
 
B.  Costs of Pretrial Release 
 
As compared to pretrial detention, pretrial release generates relatively 
minimal direct costs. For example, in the federal system, pretrial release 
programs cost $3,100 to $4,600 per defendant, depending upon the degree 
                                                                                                                       
30 On average, incarceration results in $4960 and $1205 in lost federal and state tax 
revenue, respectively. Loren A.N. Buddress, Federal Probation and Pretrial Services—A 
Cost-Effective and Successful Community Corrections System, 61 FED. PROB. 5, 10 (1997).  
31 William A. Brockett, Jr., Presumed Guilty: The Pre-Trial Detainee, 1 YALE REV. L. 
& SOC. ACTION 10, 18 (1970) (explaining that the appointment of Public Defenders for pre-
trial detainees is “another financial burden . . . placed on the state”).  
32 Jeffrey Manns, Liberty Takings: A Framework for Compensating Pretrial 
Detainees, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1947, 1974 (2005) (“Children may suffer from both the 
absence of a detained parent, and from neglect from other family members who may be 
forced to spread their attention more widely or work to make ends meet.”).  
33 Pogrebin, et al., supra note 19, at 66; see also John Hagan & Ronit Dinovitzer, 
Collateral Consequences of Imprisonment for Children, Communities, and Prisoners, 26 
CRIME & JUST.: REV. OF RES. 121, 121–29 (1999) (discussing the various challenges and 
issues that the children of detained parents face); JEREMY TRAVIS, ET AL., FAMILIES LEFT 
BEHIND: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF INCARCERATION AND REENTRY 2 (2005) (arguing that	  “parental separation due to imprisonment can have profound consequences for children”).  
34 JASON AMOS, ALL. FOR EXCELLENT EDUC., DROPOUTS, DIPLOMAS, AND DOLLARS: 
U.S. HIGH SCHOOLS AND THE NATION’S ECONOMY 2 (2008), http://all4ed.org/wp-
content/uploads/2008/08/Econ2008.pdf.  
35 Pogrebin et al., supra note 19, at 66; Manns, supra note 32, at 1974.  
36 Manns, supra note 32, at 1971–72 (stating that detainees face many different types 
of cost, some of which are incalculable).  
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of flight risk and comparative dangerousness of the defendant.37 These 
estimates account for the costs of supervision, alternative residential 
arrangements or treatment programs, and the cost of recovering defendants 
who have fled the jurisdiction. The amount of budget funds apportioned to 
these programs can be unusually small, yet highly effective; one 
municipality with a population of 50,000 has a fully functioning pretrial 
release program supported by an annual operating budget of $19,880.38 
Thus, pretrial release in the majority of cases would clearly result in 
substantially enhanced direct-cost savings to state and federal budgets.  
However, the decision to release a defendant pretrial gives rise to other 
costs, which, though indirect, are nonetheless borne by society. Foremost 
among these are the costs that come from releasing defendants who 
reoffend during the interim period between release and resolution of their 
cases. That is, there are costs of crimes that would not have been committed 
but for the pretrial release of dangerous defendants.39 When defendants that 
are granted pretrial release go on to commit crimes, there is a concomitant 
increase in law enforcement costs, court costs, and the costs borne by 
victims.40 Crime also imposes further costs on society, such as reduced 
housing prices,41 and reduction in local business activity.42 Table 1 below 
provides a comprehensive estimate of the unit cost to society for individual 
crimes. 
                                                
37 Marie VanNostrand & Geena Keebler, Pretrial Risk Assessment in the Federal 
Court, 73 FED. PROB. 2, 6 (2009).  
38 Melinda Tanner et al., Evaluating Pretrial Services Programs in North Carolina, 
72 FED. PROB. 18, 19–20 (2008).  
39 Manns, supra note 32, at 1968; see also Bak, supra note 1417, at 64–65 (discussing 
the various costs associated with the release of prisoners).  
40 Manns, supra note 32 at 1968; see also Andrew W. Bogue & Thomas G. Fritz, The 
Six-Man Jury, 17 S.D. L. REV. 285, 288–90 (1972) (discussing the cost of jury trials in 
South Dakota); Julie Berry Cullen & Steven D. Levitt, Crime, Urban Flight, and the 
Consequences for Cities, 81 REV. ECON. & STAT. 159, 159–60, 168–69 (1999) (analyzing 
the cost of crime and its effect on cities); Benjamin Landis, Jury Trials and the Delay of 
Justice, 56 A.B.A. J. 950, 950–51 (1970) (discussing costs associated with jury trials); see 
generally THOMAS H. COHEN & BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE COURT 
PROCESSING STATISTICS, 1990-2004: PRETRIAL RELEASE OF FELONY DEFENDANTS IN 
STATE COURTS (2007) (discussing the effects and costs of pretrial release for felony 
defendants).  
41 Ralph B. Taylor, The Impact of Crime on Communities, 539 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POL. & SOC. SCI. 28, 37 (1995) (stating that an increase in violent crime lowered home 
values in various areas).  
42 See, e.g., Robert T. Greenbaum & George E. Tita, The Impact of Violence Surges 
on Neighbourhood Business Activity, 41 URB. STUD. 2495 (2004); Wesley Skogan, Fear of 
Crime and Neighborhood Change, 8 CRIME & JUST. 203, 204, 222 (1986).  
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Table 1. Total Per-Offense Cost for Different Crimes in 2014 dollars43 
 
Type of offense Tangible cost 
($) 
Intangible cost 
($) 
Total cost ($) 
Murder 1,420,857 9,333,475 10,754,332 
Rape/sexual assault 45,608 220,724 266,332 
Aggravated assault 21,528 105,057 126,585 
Robbery 23,630 24,959 48,589 
Arson 18,164 5,675 23,839 
Motor vehicle theft 11,646 290 11,936 
Stolen property 8,816 N/A 8,816 
Household burglary 6,820 355 7,175 
Embezzlement 6,059 N/A 6,059 
Forgery and 
counterfeiting 5,821 N/A 5,821 
Fraud 5,563 N/A 5,563 
Vandalism 5,373 N/A 5,373 
Larceny/theft 3,895 11 3,906 
 
II.  A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF PRETRIAL DETENTION DECISIONS IN 
FELONY ARREST CASES 
 
Cost-benefit analysis allows a consideration of whether decisions are 
efficient and how well empirical data is being followed. By drawing on 
various estimates presented in previous sections of this Article, and by 
relying on data from my previous work estimating the probabilities 
                                                
43 See Kathryn E. McCollister et al., The Cost of Crime to Society: New Crime-
Specific Estimates for Policy and Program Evaluation, 108 DRUG & ALCOHOL 
DEPENDENCE 98, 104 tbls.3 & 4 (2010). The dollar values have been adjusted for inflation 
to reflect the value of 2014 dollars.  
The study identifies four main categories of costs resulting from crime: (1) victim 
costs, covering direct economic losses, such as health care costs, lost earnings, and 
property losses; (2) criminal justice system costs, including government expenditures on 
police protection, legal services, and corrections; (3) crime career costs, which estimate the 
opportunity costs incurred by the choice to forego legal activities; and (4) intangible costs, 
which estimates the indirect societal costs suffered by victims, such as pain and suffering, 
stress, and a lower quality life. Id.  
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associated with criminal behavior during pretrial release,44 I demonstrate 
below that 28% fewer defendants could have been detained pretrial over the 
past decade without statistical risk to the public. Furthermore, this reduction 
in detentions would have saved defendants and society an estimated $78 
billion.  
The first subsection estimates the economic benefits to society of 
pretrial detention, while the second estimates the economic costs. 
Subsection C compares the results of the two preceding subsections and 
makes assessments as to the types of individuals for which, empirically, it 
would be more cost effective to either release or detain pretrial. 
 
A.  Estimating the Costs Avoided Through Pretrial Detention 
 
The benefits of pretrial detention include avoiding (1) the costs 
associated with prosecuted crimes committed during the interim period 
between release and trial, (2) failures to appear, (3) felonies for which no 
arrest is made, and (4) the cost of monitoring a released individual. I rely on 
estimates by other scholars for each of these costs. Table 2 below lists 
estimates for the potentially avoidable costs associated with each type of 
crime and the sources from which I derived each estimate.  
To estimate the rate of re-arrest prior to trial, I used Bureau of Justice 
Statistics (BJS) data from 134,767 randomly selected felony arrest cases 
between 1990 and 2006. The BJS regularly collects information on felony 
arrestees in the nation’s seventy-five largest counties, reporting information 
on each defendant’s demographic characteristics, the type of offense, status 
in the criminal justice system at the time of arrest, criminal history, bail and 
pretrial release, court appearance record, and rearrests while on pretrial 
release.45  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
44 See generally Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 7, at 557–58 (analyzing and 
discussing the most common predictive factors of pretrial violence, as well as the effect 
they have on prisoner detention and release).  
45 Data Collection: State Court Processing Statistics (SCPS), BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail&iid=282#Publications_and_ 
products (last visited Jan. 17, 2016). This data is also known as State Court Processing 
Statistics (SCPS).   
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Table 2. Economic Benefits of Detention46	  
Description 
Benefits per incident in $ 
Low Estimate ($) High Estimate 
($) 
Violent crimes avoided   
Murder 4,602,32647 18,780,12048 
Rape 136,19149 488,24350 
Assault 14,71551 158,25052 
Robbery 12,52353 364,89854 
Other 75,45355 426,57156 
Property crimes avoided   
Motor vehicle theft 5,94957 19,29958 
Forgery 5,73159 10,43960 
                                                
46 Note that the dollar values of each estimate from each respective source have been 
adjusted for inflation to reflect the value of 2014 dollars.  
47 MILLER ET AL., supra note 16, at 9 tbl.2.  
48 Matt DeLisi et al., Murder by Numbers: Monetary Costs Imposed by a Sample of 
Homicide Offenders, 21 J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHOL. 501, 506 (2010). AW 
49 MILLER ET AL., supra note 16, at 9 tbl.2.  
50 DeLisi et al., supra note 48, at 506.  
51 MILLER ET AL., supra note 16, at 9 tbl.2.  
52 DeLisi et al., supra note 48, at 506.  
53 MILLER ET AL., supra note 16, at 9 tbl.2.  
54 DeLisi et al., supra note 48, at 506.  
55 MILLER ET AL., supra note 16, at 9 tbl.2. 
56 DeLisi et al., supra note 48, at 506. 
57 MILLER ET AL., supra note 16, at 9 tbl.2.  
58 Jeffrey A. Butts & John K. Roman, Juvenile Crime Interventions, in INVESTING IN 
THE DISADVANTAGED: ASSESSING THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF SOCIAL POLICIES 103 
(David L. Weimer & Aidan R. Vining eds., 2009).  
59 McCollister, et al., supra note 43, at 104 tbls.3 & 4.  
60 Butts & Roman, supra note 58.  
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Fraud 3,95061 5,47862 
Burglary 2,19263 44,87564 
Larceny 58065 3,83966 
Other 3,95067 10,43968 
Drug crimes avoided   
Sales 73069 73070 
Possession/Other 3471 3472 
Public order crimes avoided   
Driving-related 18,66173 33,85874 
Weapons 3,09475 3,09476 
Other 6,55477 6,55478 
Avoidance of failure to 40979 51880 
                                                
61 Mark A. Cohen & Alex R. Piquero, New Evidence on the Monetary Value of Saving 
a High Risk Youth, 25 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 25, 33 tbl.5 (2009).  
62 McCollister, et al., supra note 43, at 104 tbls.3 & 4.  
63 MILLER ET AL., supra note 16, at 9 tbl.2.  
64 DeLisi et al., supra note 48, at 506.  
65 MILLER ET AL., supra note 16, at 9 tbl.2.  
66 McCollister, et al., supra note 43, at 104 tbls.3 & 4.  
67 DeLisi et al., supra note 48, at 506. 
68 Id. 
69 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S. & OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL 
POLICY, THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF DRUG ABUSE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1992-2002 (2004).  
70 Id.  
71 Andrew S. Rajkumar & Michael T. French, Drug Abuse, Crime Costs, and the 
Economic Benefits of Treatment, 13 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 291, 308 tbl.III 
(1997).  
72 Id.  
73 MILLER ET AL., supra note 16, at 9 tbl.2.  
74 Cohen & Piquero, supra note 61, at 33 tbl.5.  
75 JOHN ROMAN & AARON CHALFIN, URBAN INST., DOES IT PAY TO INVEST IN 
REENTRY PROGRAMS FOR JAIL INMATES? 16 tbl.10 (2006), 
http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/roman_chalfin.pdf.  
76 Id.  
77 Id.  
78 Id.  
79 Abrams & Rohlfs, supra note 26, at 767.  
80 Id.  
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appear  
Avoidance of felony for 
which no arrest is made 40,33881 40,33882 
Avoidance of daily cost of 
monitoring released 
individual 983 984 
 
Estimating the economic benefit of pretrial detention involves two steps. 
First, I model the probability that a defendant commits a particular felony 
during pretrial release as a function of the category of original arrest 
(violent crime, property crime, drug crime, or public order crime), 
defendant age, year of arrest, and prior criminal record. Second, I multiply 
the probability of re-arrest by the benefits listed in Table 2. This procedure 
assigns each defendant from the BJS data a monetary value that reflects the 
expected economic benefit of pretrial detention. Below, I briefly summarize 
and present the results for each step. 
As the first step in determining the costs imposed if a released detainee 
commits a crime, I model the probability of a defendant i committing a 
particular felony f in year t in county c as follows: 
 𝑓!"# = 𝛼! + 𝑋!"#𝛽 + 𝑍!"𝛾 + 𝜖!"# 
 
where 𝑋!"#  are a defendant’s observed characteristics, 𝑍!"  are county 
characteristics, and 𝜖!"# is an unobserved error term. Using standard probit 
regressions, I then estimate the model for each of the sixteen felonies 
reported in Table 2.85 This assigns each defendant an unobserved index 
value that reflects the likelihood of arrest during pretrial release. Defendants 
actually arrested for a particular felony are assigned a positive value, while 
those not rearrested receive a negative value. I convert these values into 
probabilities by maximizing the log of: 
                                                
81 Abrams & Rohlfs, supra note 26, at 768.  
82 Id.  
83 Buddress, supra note 30, at 5. This figure is found by dividing the yearly 
supervision cost per year ($2,344) by 365, and adjusting for inflation to reflect the value of 
2014 dollars. Id.  
84 Id.  
85 Results from the sixteen probit regression models and descriptive statistics for 
predictor variables are presented in appendix A. 
Forthcoming in BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2017 
 
14 
 
𝑃(𝑓!"# > 0)!!"#!!!! 𝑃(𝑓!"# ≤ 0)!!!!"# 
Figure 1 below displays the results of these calculations. These 
calculations are striking in the sense that they contravene the average 
individual’s estimations about the frequency of re-offense post-release. 
While an individual arrested for a felony and then released may well be 
more likely than a non-arrested individual to commit a crime, the 
probability of re-arrest for a new felony during pretrial release is actually 
relatively low. On average, a defendant on pretrial release has only an 
11.36% chance of being rearrested for a felony. Only 3.43% of all 
defendants are more than 26% likely to be rearrested while on release, while 
nearly 90% of all defendants are less than 20% likely to be rearrested post-
release. 
 
Figure 1. Probability of Re-arrest if Released 
 
 
The calculations presented in conjunction with Figure 1 above reveal a 
point crucial to my analysis: speaking in general terms, the relative cost of 
releasing some defendants is actually greater than the cost of detaining 
those defendants; the converse is also true for other subsets of defendants.  
The next step, then, is to derive a formula that will determine the 
economic benefit of pretrial detention for each individual defendant. I 
22.19% 
29.59% 
22.91% 
14.88% 
6.99% 
3.43% 
5% or Less 6 to 10% 11 to 15% 16 to 20% 21 to 25% 26% or more 
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accomplish this by multiplying the probability of re-arrest by the economic 
savings associated with avoiding the felonies reported in Table 2. The total 
benefit b for preventing person i living in year t and county c from 
committing felony f is: 
 𝑏!"# = 𝑃!"# 𝑓$ 
 
where f$ represents the economic savings in 2014 dollars of avoiding felony 
f. 
Of course, felonies-avoided is only one category of cost savings that this 
analysis must account for. Using the same two procedures described above, 
I also calculate the economic savings associated with avoiding a 
defendant’s failure to appear in court and avoiding felonies for which no 
arrest is made. The total economic benefits, represented as S, through 
detaining a particular defendant is given by 
 𝑆!"# = 𝑏!"# + 𝑙!"#!!!! +!!!! 9𝑑!"# 
 
where l represents the benefit of avoiding failures to appear and felonies for 
which there is no arrest, and d represents the number of days between arrest 
and adjudication. This formula will later prove useful in estimating the costs 
potentially avoided through cost-benefit analysis. 
Overall, this Part demonstrates that the relative cost of releasing some 
defendants is actually greater than the cost of detaining them, but that 
releasing some defendants allows substantial savings. And by using 
information on which defendants are safe to release, judges can make more 
informed decisions pretrial. 
 
B.  Estimating the Costs of Pretrial Detention 
 
The converse of the benefits of pretrial release are the costs imposed 
when judges decide to continue to detain a pretrial detainee. There are a 
number of direct and indirect economic costs inherent in continuing to 
detain a defendant pretrial. These include loss of freedom, income, and 
housing, childcare costs, stolen/lost property, strain on intimate 
relationships, potential violent or sexual assault, prison operation, loss of 
federal and local tax revenue, and welfare benefits paid to a detainee’s 
family. I again rely on external sources to estimate each of these costs, 
which are presented in Table 3 below. Each source’s estimate has been 
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converted into a per-day detainment cost. Additionally, some sources 
reported only a single, general-level economic figure, while others provided 
estimates for specific years or geographic areas. When possible, I adjusted 
the cost estimates for each individual defendant’s geographic location and 
year of arrest. The last column of Table 3 shows these calculations, where y, 
represents a year-specific adjustment, and a, is an area-specific adjustment. 
The total cost of detainment (E) for a given person i in year t living in 
county c is 
𝐸!"# = 𝑒!𝑦!𝑎!𝑑!!!!!  
where d is the number of days between arrest and adjudication.   
 
Table 3. Economic Costs of Detention86 
Description	   Key figure(s) Expense ($) Calculation  for  person  i  
Individual Costs  
Loss of 
freedom 
Typical defendant 
willing to pay 
$1,036 for 90 days 
of freedom87 
~$11 per day 
($1,036/90)  𝑒! = $1,03690 𝑑!     
Loss of 
income 
Mean U.S. county 
per capita income 
is approximately 
$31,02888 
~$85 per day 
($31,028/ 
365) 
𝑒! = $31,028365 𝑦!𝑎!𝑑!   
Loss of 
housing 
23% of 
misdemeanants 
forfeit $1,565 in 
lost and new 
deposits89 
~$2,748 if 
detained 60+ 
days 
𝑒! = $1,565𝑚!   
                                                
86 The dollar values have been adjusted for inflation to reflect the value of 2014 
dollars.  The variable m takes on a value of 1 if a defendant has been detained for greater 
than 60 days and zero otherwise. 
87 Abrams & Rohlfs, supra note 26, at 750–51.  
88 State & County Quickfacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html (last updated Dec. 2, 2015, 11:15 AM).  
89 Pogrebin, et al., supra note 19.  
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Childcare 
costs  
Families earning 
under $56,670 
spend $1,938 per 
year in childcare 
costs for children 
five and under; 90 
a majority of 
inmates have 
minor children91 
~$5 per day 
($1,938/ 
365) 
𝑒! = $1,938365 𝑑!   
Stolen or lost 
property 
Approximately 
one out of three 
inmates have 
property stolen; 92 
larceny costs $580 
per incident93 
~$193 per 
incident (if 
detained 60+ 
days) 
($580/3) 
𝑒! = $5803 𝑚!   
Strain on 
intimate 
relationships 
Marriage is worth 
$103,670 per 
year; 94 17% of 
federal inmates 
are married95 
~$84 per day 
(($103,670)(.
26))/365 
𝑒!= $103,670 . 26365 𝑑!   
Possibility of 
violent or 
sexual assault 
4.43.2% of prison 
and 3.1% of jail 
inmates report one 
or more incidents 
of sexual 
victimization; 96 
~$11 per day 
(($136,191 
(.032))/365 
𝑒!= $136,191 . 032365 𝑑!   
                                                
90 MARK LINO, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., EXPENDITURES ON CHILDREN BY FAMILIES, 
2010 26 tbl.1 (2011).  
91 LAUREN E. GLAZE & LAURA N. MARUSCHAK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 
SPECIAL REPORT: PARENTS IN PRISON AND THEIR MINOR CHILDREN 1 (2008).  
92 ROY D. KING & KATHLEEN MCDERMOTT, THE STATE OF OUR PRISONS 119 (1995).  
93 MILLER ET AL., supra note 16, at 9 tbl.2.  
94 David G. Blanchflower & Andrew J. Oswald, Well-being Over Time in Britain and 
the USA, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 1359, 1381 (2004).  
95 GLAZE & MARUSCHAK, supra note 91, at 21 app. tbl.16. (Since 201,600 out of 
1,226,200 state inmates are married and 33,600 out of 129,300 federal inmates are married, 
thus, the total married is 235,200 out of 1,355,500 for a percentage of 17.35%). 
96 BECK ET AL., supra note 24, at 5 (An estimated 4.4% of prison inmates and 3.1% of 
jail inmates reported experiencing one or more incidents of sexual victimization by another 
inmate or facility staff in the past 12 months or since admission to the facility, if less than 
12 months.) 
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rape costs 
$136,191 per 
incident97 
Public Costs  
Prison 
operation 
costs 
Mean U.S. state 
cost of inmate 
detainment is 
$31,40698 
~$83 per day 
($31,406/ 
365) 
𝑒! = $31,406365 𝑎!𝑑!   
Loss of federal 
tax 
Annual federal tax 
revenue reduced 
by $5,142 per 
incarceration99 
~$19 per day 
($5,142/365) 𝑒! = $5,142365 𝑑!   
Loss of state 
tax 
Annual state tax 
revenue reduced 
by $1,249 per 
incarceration100 
~$3 per day 
($1,249/365) 𝑒! = $1,249365 𝑑!   
Welfare for 
detainee’s 
family 
Typical family of 
incarcerated 
person receives 
$8,293 per year in 
welfare benefits101 
~$30 per day 
($8,293/365) 𝑒! = $8,293365 𝑑!   
 
 
  
 
Figure 2 below incorporates these calculations to display the average 
estimated direct cost resulting from a decision to detain or release a 
defendant before trial. In conjunction with Figure 1 above, these 
calculations show, perhaps unsurprisingly, that the economic costs of 
pretrial detention typically exceed the costs imposed by pretrial release. 
Specifically, the average cost of detention exceeds the cost of release by 
approximately $20,000; detaining a defendant, on average, results in 
                                                
97 MILLER ET AL., supra note 16, at 9 tbl.2.  
98 STEPHAN, supra note 15, at 1.  
99 Buddress, supra note 30, at 10.  
100 Id.  
101 Id.  
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$40,300 in direct costs, while the mean cost of releasing a defendant pretrial 
is just $19,500. 
Figure 2. Mean Cost of Release and Detention 
 
 
Of course, these calculations are merely the result in the average case—
and theoretical results, at that. Figure 3, below, puts theory into practice by 
displaying the estimated direct cost of pretrial release and detention in 
actual judicial pretrial detention and release decisions. Out of 132,865 
defendants, 62% were released, while the remaining 38% were detained.102 
Importantly, the reported data presented in Figure 3 mirror the data 
presented in Figure 2 above; pretrial release resulted in an average direct 
cost of $18,014 compared to an average cost of $29,700 for pretrial 
detention.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
102 COHEN & REAVES, supra note 40, at 1–2.  
$19,500 
$40,300 
Mean Direct Cost of Release 
for SPCS Cases (n=132,865) 
Mean Direct Cost of 
Detention for SPCS Cases 
(n=132,865) 
Felonies estimated less costly Middle Felonies estimated more costly 
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Figure 3. Direct Cost Differentials Between Released and Detained 
SCPS Cases 
 
C.  Net Economic Benefit of Pretrial Release 
 
The cost calculations set forth above mean that pretrial release is, 
accounting for all costs and benefits, often less expensive than pretrial 
detention, and suggest that judges would do best to release defendants 
pretrial more often than detain. To complete the analysis, however, one 
must also account for the benefits of avoiding costs associated with pretrial 
detention. If the cost of releasing a defendant, including the cost of any 
crimes committed during release, exceeds the cost of detention, releasing 
the defendant fails to produce a net economic benefit. Similarly, if the cost 
of detention exceeds the cost of release, detaining the defendant pretrial 
fails to produce a net economic benefit. Table 4 below presents a 
hypothetical representations of the four possible net benefit scenarios of 
pretrial detention decisions: detain with negative net benefit; detain with 
positive net benefit; release with negative net benefit; and release with 
positive net benefit. 
 
 
 
 
$18,014 
$29,700 
Mean Cost per Released 
Case in SCPS (n=82,468) 
Mean Cost per Detained 
Cased in SCPS (n=50,397) 
Felonies estimated less costly Middle Felonies estimated more costly 
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Table 4. Net Benefit Scenarios  
Scenario 
Detained 
or 
Released? 
Cost of 
Detention 
($)	  
Cost of 
Release 
($)	  
Net 
Benefit 
Formula 
($)	  
Net 
Benefit 
($)	  
A Detained 25,000	   20,000	   20,000 - 
25,000	  
-  5,000	  
B Detained 25,000	   30,000	   30,000 - 
25,000	  
+ 5,000	  
C Released 25,000	   30,000	   25,000 - 
30,000	  
- 5,000	  
D Released 25,000	   20,000	   25,000 - 
20,000	  
+  5,000	  
 
Using the cost and benefit calculations from the previous two 
subsections, it is possible to measure the expected net benefit associated 
with the decision to release or detain each defendant in the BJS data. To 
calculate the net benefit of release, I subtract the expected benefit of release 
from the expected cost of detainment. The decision to release a defendant 
produces a net economic benefit if the costs imposed on society of releasing 
the defendant do not exceed the expected cost of detainment. The net 
benefit formula for release is therefore 
 𝑁!"# = 𝐸!"# − 𝑆!"# 
 
where N is the net benefit, E is the economic cost of detention, and S is the 
benefit (i.e., avoided cost of release) for each defendant in the sample.  
For defendants detained pretrial, the formula is simply reversed. That is, 
a judge’s decision not to release a defendant pretrial produces a net benefit 
if the avoided cost of release (i.e. monitoring, crime, failure to appear, etc.) 
exceeds the expense of detainment.  
 𝑁!"# = 𝑆!"# − 𝐸!"# 
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The analysis that follows reports three different net benefit calculations 
in three different scenarios: (1) the net benefit of judges’ actual pretrial 
detention decisions between 1990 and 2006; (2) the net benefit if all judges 
had released every defendant; and (3) the net benefit if judges had detained 
every defendant. Recall that Table 2 above reported a range of costs 
associated with each of sixteen felonies: a low estimate, a high estimate, 
and an average estimate. Figure 4 below presents each of those estimates in 
the three alternate scenarios.  
 
Figure 4. Net Benefit Scenarios 
 
Note that the actual decisions in practice produced a net benefit per 
defendant of around $15,664 but that the actual decisions to detain 
defendants produced a $6,771 loss on average. Compared to the actual 
benefits achieved, a policy of universal pretrial release would have 
produced approximately $5,000 in economic savings per defendant. Thus, 
even a universal pretrial release regime is better than the current system, at 
least as far as costs and benefits are concerned. 
Of course, universal release is neither feasible nor the optimal policy 
from an efficiency standpoint as crime rates could potentially increase. 
Table 5 shows that 50% of all pretrial detentions produced an economic 
benefit, while around 20% of pretrial releases resulted in an economic loss. 
This result has broader implications for cost-benefit analysis in pretrial 
detention decisionmaking; that is, systematically fine tuning pretrial 
$29,357 
-$6,772 
$20,801 
-$20,801 $15,665 
Net Benefit per 
Released SCPS 
Case (n=82,468) 
Net Benefit per 
Detained SCPS 
Case (n=50,397) 
Net benefit if 
All SCPS Cases 
Released 
(n=132,865) 
Net Benefit if 
All SCPS Cases 
Detained 
(n=132,865) 
Actual Net 
Benefit per 
SCPS Case 
(n=132,865) 
Felonies estimated less costly Middle Felonies estimated more costly 
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detention decisions through cost-benefit analysis could result in significant 
economic savings to society.  
 
 
Table 5. Net Benefit by Release or Detention 
Category % with Net Benefit Benefit in $	  
% with Net 
Loss	   Loss in $	  
Released 
(n=82,468) 
80.2	  
 
40,483	   19.8	   15,525	  
Detained 
(n=50,397) 
50.0	   16,699	   50.0	   30,208	  
 
 
The critical task, then, is to identify those defendants for whom pretrial 
detention produces a net benefit. That task may be accomplished by finding 
subsets of defendants who share common characteristics that could lead to a 
general framework for making cost-benefit calculations in pretrial detention 
decisions. If these defendants share common characteristics that differ 
systematically from defendants for whom pretrial detention produces a net 
loss, then judges could use criteria backed by empirical data in order to 
promote more efficient and equitable decisions.   
Figure 5 represents a first step in this direction. It displays the net 
benefit of pretrial detention for each defendant in the BJS data in order of 
lowest net benefit to highest. Note that 31% of all defendants would 
produce a net benefit if detained. This figure is seven percentage points 
lower than the 38% of defendants judges actually detained.103 It likewise 
takes a substantially more middle ground approach: a 31% detention rate is 
a far more conservative, feasible, and preferable approach to a policy of 
universal release.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
103 COHEN & REAVES, supra note 40, at 2.  
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Figure 5. Net Benefits of Detention by Percentile 
 
 
Clearly, an optimal pretrial detention policy would detain only those 
individuals for whom detention will on average produce a net benefit to 
society. Figure 6 shows the significant savings of such a policy compared to 
actual pretrial detention decisions and universal release. Note that the net 
benefit per defendant in the optimal scenario is almost $30,000, which 
represents savings of approximately $10,000 per defendant under universal 
release and approximately $15,000 compared to judges’ actual pretrial 
detention decisions.  
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Figure 6. Direct Cost and Net Benefit of Release of SCPS Cases 
 
 
 
To determine the characteristics that best predict criminal behavior 
during release, I model the expected net benefit of detention as a function of 
the category of a defendant’s original arrest (i.e. violent, property, drug-
related, or public order), age, year, prior criminal history, and geographic 
location. Thus, the economic benefits b of detaining person i in year t living 
in county c are determined by 
 log  𝑏!"# = 𝛼! + 𝑋!"#𝛽 + 𝑍!"𝛾 + 𝜖!"# 
 
where X are a defendant’s observed characteristics, Z are county 
characteristics, and 𝜖 is an unobserved error term.104 Using the BJS data, I 
estimate the model using an ordinary-least squares regression, the results of 
which are reported in Table 6 below. 
 
 
                                                
104 The net benefits variable has undergone a log transformation because it was not 
normally distributed. Taking the natural log of net benefits more accurately reflects the 
relationship between the net benefits of detention and the predictor variables.   
$22,068 
$19,499 
$14,424 $15,665 
$20,065 
$30,953 
Per Actual SCPS Case If All SCPS Cases Released If Only + Net Benefit 
SCPS Cases Detained 
Direct Cost Net Benefit 
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Table 6. Log of Benefits List Regressed on Predictor Variables105 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error	  
Type of original crime   
 Violent -- -- 
 Property -0.818*** 0.003 
 Drug -0.651*** 0.007 
 Public Order -0.674*** 0.004 
Prior arrests   
 None -- -- 
 One -0.246*** 0.007 
 Two or Three -0.128*** 0.013 
 Four or more 0.622*** 0.005 
Prior Incarceration 0.314*** 0.002 
Multiple Charges -0.131*** 0.004 
Prior Failure to Appear 0.434*** 0.005 
Active Criminal Justice Status 0.454*** 0.004 
Felon -0.162*** 0.004 
Age   
 19 or less -- -- 
 20 to 24 -0.559*** 0.004 
 25 to 29 -1.287*** 0.009 
 30 to39 -1.605*** 0.011 
 40 to 49 -2.324*** 0.018 
 50 or more -1.850*** 0.008 
Constant     9.559***          0.082 
   
Year Dummies          YES  
County Characteristic Controls          YES 132,865  
                                                
105 See Appendix A for year and county coefficients. Note that N =132,865. Note that 
*** denotes a coefficient is statistically significant at the p ≤ .001 level. 
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Critically, the course of this regression analysis reveals six defendant-
specific factors with the greatest influence on the net benefit derived from 
detention in a particular case: (1) original arrest for a violent crime, (2) four 
or more prior arrests, (3) prior incarceration, (4) a prior failure to appear, (5) 
an active criminal justice status, and (6) aged nineteen or younger. These 
six characteristics, then, are those that have the potential to be the most 
useful in making cost-benefit calculations for pretrial detention decisions.  
The analysis also demonstrates that releasing an individual with any one 
of these six characteristics results in the direct costs of $159,519. Yet, 
judges released 30% of defendants with these characteristics.106 Conversely, 
releasing individuals who possess none of these characteristics results in an 
average cost of $4,181 per defendant. Yet, judges detained 18.6% of these 
defendants.107 
 The impacts of these variables on the net benefits of detention are 
striking and substantial. On average, detaining a defendant with four or 
more prior arrests produces a net benefit 82% higher than detaining a 
defendant with no prior history. Likewise, detaining a defendant who has 
either a prior incarceration or a prior failure to appear produces net benefits 
37% and 54% higher, respectively, than defendants with neither. Finally, 
detention of a defendant with active criminal justice status produces net 
benefit 57% higher than detention of a defendant without active status. With 
respect to the type of offense, detaining a defendant arrested for a violent 
crime produces average net benefits 44% higher than a defendant arrested 
for a property crime, 52% higher than a defendant arrested for a drug crime, 
and 51% higher than defendants arrested for public order crimes.108 It thus 
seems that a middle-ground approach to pretrial detention, in which judges 
decide to release some offenders and detain others based on statistical risk, 
is economically preferable to any system of universal release or detention. 
The middle-ground approach is likewise preferable to the current pretrial 
detention system. 
                                                
106 COHEN & REAVES, supra note 40. This is not to say that judges should detain all 
defendants under the age of 19, regardless of their prior criminal history. 
107 Id.  
108 See J.M. WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A MODERN APPROACH 
636 (2009). 
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Given the sheer number of felony arrests per year,109 pretrial detention 
policies that incorporate judicial consideration of these characteristics could 
save billions of dollars per year. For example, Figure 7 below shows how 
accounting for some of the characteristics identified in Table 6 could result 
in significant savings. Even a simple policy, such as universally detaining 
any defendant under the age of twenty-four who was arrested for a violent 
felony and releasing all others, produces a higher net benefit than either a 
universal release policy or judges’ actual detention decisions. Such a policy 
saves an average of $7,624 per defendant relative to judges’ actual 
detention decisions and $1,341 compared to universal release.110 Note that 
these savings would accrue despite employing a detainment rate that is 
twenty-eight percentage points lower than the actual detention rate.111 
 
Figure 7. Direct Cost and Net Benefit of Detainment Violent Felony 
Arrests, Age 24 or Less 
 
	  
                                                
109 See generally HOWARD N. SNYDER, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ARREST IN THE 
UNITED STATES, 1990-2010 (2012) (reporting detailed statistics and information about the 
number of arrests in the United States from 1990 to 2010).  
110 COHEN & REAVES, supra note 40.  
111 Id.  
$21,832 
$19,499 
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If Only Violent Felony 
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Detained) 
Direct Cost Net Benefit 
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Multiplying the economic savings per defendant calculated in Figure 7 
by the number of felony arrests in America112 yields savings of $78 billion 
compared to current policies and $14 billion compared to universal release. 
Clearly, the dollar net savings realized from utilizing this cost-benefit 
approach are substantial. Yet a look beneath the bottom line reveals 
something far more interesting. The reason why such an amount can be 
saved is because, at least in the context of pretrial detention decisions, it is 
statistically more costly to detain some defendants than it would be to 
release them, and vice versa. As explained above, the balancing test in 
which judges engage in making pretrial detention or release decisions 
requires judges to weigh a detainee’s liberty interest against the risk of the 
detainee committing a crime while freed on bail. This implies that judges 
take into account the nature of the crime for which a detainee is accused, 
because the risk of releasing a detainee accused of, say, murder, is probably 
greater than the risk incurred for releasing an individual accused of a 
nonviolent crime, such as property damage or petty larceny. 
This cost-benefit analysis took these necessarily vague and indefinite 
risk calculations, and attached quantified costs incurred and avoided for the 
detention of specific subsets of detainees. The main takeaways from this 
Article are as follows. First, there are ways for judges to know which 
defendants are more likely to pose a threat pretrial.113 Second, this analysis 
shows not merely that release of pretrial detainees is less costly overall, but 
that it is more cost effective to release some and detain others. Specifically, 
it is more cost effective to detain individuals who pose a violent crime risk 
because of the costs imposed if these individuals commit crimes similar to 
those for which they are accused while on bail. Conversely, it is more cost 
effective to release nonviolent detainees because the costs to the individual 
and society are significantly lower if these individuals commit similar 
crimes while on bail. Finally, the reason why cost-benefit analysis may 
result in substantial savings to society comes from classifying pretrial 
detainees into subsets, aggregating costs associated with detention or 
release, and allowing judges to render decisions accordingly. 
 
III.  LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
                                                
112 SNYDER, supra note 109, at 2 tbl.1.  
113 See also Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 7, at 557–58 (discussing the most 
common predictive factors of pretrial crime that judges should be mindful of).  
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In the pretrial arena, cost-benefit analysis may prove to be an effective 
tool to help judges rationally decide whether economics support releasing or 
detaining defendants pretrial. My goal has been to identify what benefits 
and costs are implicit in both decisions and to discover a means of 
accomplishing this analysis for the ultimate benefit of society. There are 
certainly limitations with this approach. I suggest that, despite the 
limitations discussed below, a cost-based pretrial detention method is, if not 
necessarily the best approach, an important consideration for legislative 
policy and judicial evaluation for pretrial detention. 
 
A.  Impact of Latent Variables on Estimates 
 
The analysis detailed above relies on the assumption that, in data 
collected by the BJS, judges did not rely on any characteristics of the 
defendants or the crime they were accused of that were not subsequently 
collected by the survey. To the extent that judges used unreported 
information available to them to correctly detain defendants of greater 
hazard to the community, the cost benefit calculations in this Article will be 
incorrect. To use an extreme hypothetical: if all of the defendants actually 
detained would have committed murder had they been released prior to 
trial, and the judge detained them because of unreported knowledge (i.e. 
perhaps they made threats at a hearing), then the decision making 
framework suggested in this Article vastly overestimates the hypothetical 
benefit of releasing such defendants. 
Because some jurisdictions have a much higher rate of pretrial detention 
than others for similar crimes, it’s unlikely that latent variables have played 
a significant, systematic role in judicial decisionmaking. Creating 
decisionmaking criteria that do not suffer from latent variable bias would 
require collecting data from defendants whose pretrial detention decision 
was made without any judicial discretion whatsoever. This could be 
accomplished if a jurisdiction adopted a universal release policy, randomly 
released half of all defendants, or used some other explicit heuristic such as 
the one suggested earlier in this Article. 
 
B.  Impact of Release Conditions on Analysis 
 
 This analysis does not explicitly consider the conditions of release. 
Simplifying the release choice into a simple choice of release-or-detain 
simplified the data collection and analysis, but may not reflect the reality of 
practice. Release conditions might include house arrest, an anklet 
monitoring system, or a restraining order. The use of such conditions may 
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have substantially decreased the rate of criminal acts by defendants that 
were released. One could imagine a pretrial release granted with severe 
restrictions on interaction with the public, including a house arrest, an ankle 
tracking system, and an injunction against using communication technology 
such as the telephone or internet. Given that such restrictions on freedoms 
may have significantly reduced the rate of criminal activity perpetrated by 
defendants in the past, it would be inappropriate to conclude from this 
analysis that heuristics suggesting release should necessarily be without 
such restrictions in the future. 
 
C.  Impact of Explicit Heuristic Release Criteria on Charging and Plea 
Bargaining 
 
 Currently, prosecutors have extensive discretion in choosing what 
charges to bring against a defendant, and judges have discretion to 
determine pretrial detention based on the charges brought as well as the 
circumstances as presented to them by the prosecutor. To the extent that a 
district adopted heuristics for pretrial detention based on the crime charged, 
prosecutors might alter their choice of charges brought to influence or fix 
the pretrial detention determination. Similarly, the presence of explicit 
formula in determining pretrial detention decisions might influence 
defendants to be more willing to accept a plea bargain if they knew they 
were going to be detained, much in the same way that child support 
formulas have decreased litigation in the family law context.114 Conversely, 
those defendants who knew that they would not be detained based on a 
formula might be less likely to accept a plea bargain if it meant they would 
have to immediately forfeit their freedom. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This nation spends billions of dollars detaining roughly half a million 
suspects pretrial on any given day.115 While these detentions are arguably 
                                                
114 RALPH WARNER ET AL., LIVING TOGETHER: A LEGAL GUIDE FOR UNMARRIED 
COUPLES 237–38 (15th ed. 2013) (discussing how the Child Support Enforcement Act has 
required states to adopt child support formulas, which has subsequently resulted in less 
litigation). 
115 Shima Baradaran, The State of Pretrial Detention, in The State of Criminal Justice 
2011, at 187, 190 (Myrna S. Raeder ed., 2011) (estimating that there are 500,000 total 
pretrial detainees in the United States); 
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constitutionally and morally suspect, this Article focused on the costs 
incurred on society and to the defendant to detain this group of individuals.  
While local, state, and national governments have all lamented the costs 
incurred by incarceration, this Article provides the first cost-benefit analysis 
of the pretrial detention decision. It considers the risk of crime posed by 
each group of defendant and proportionately compares this to the number 
and type of defendant released. It then considers the costs to the defendant 
of being detained and to society, but also the costs of releasing defendants, 
including consideration of the crimes these defendants may commit. While 
much legal scholarship has advocated for cost-benefit analysis in other 
areas of criminal law, little work has been done to investigate whether and 
how the same could be accomplished in pretrial detention decisions. 
Utilizing recent existing research and my own research, I have calculated 
the benefits and costs, both primary/secondary and direct/indirect, of 
pretrial detention. I also calculated the net benefits and costs of pretrial 
detention decisions in actual cases, with some important ramifications. 
The primary finding of this Article is that systematically fine tuning 
pretrial detention decisions through cost-benefit analysis could result in 
billions of dollars of economic savings to society, compared to current 
policies. Using explicit heuristics to guide their decisions, judges can 
release significantly more defendants without increased economic or social 
costs. The model suggests that only 50% of all pretrial detentions produced 
an economic benefit, while a mere 20% of pretrial releases resulted in an 
economic loss. Like any human decision maker, judges cannot make good 
choices without having quantified estimates of the risks and benefits of the 
options before them. In addition to providing those estimates, this Article 
has suggested a simple detention heuristic based on readily identifiable 
defendant-specific factors.116 
This analysis contains admitted weaknesses and limitations. As with all 
cost-benefit analyses, quantifying the costs incurred and saved is 
necessarily easier on paper than implementing them in real life. It is 
impractical to control for all potential factors in conducting such an 
analysis. For instance, putting temporal limitations on a particular analysis 
is bound to be uncertain, as the effect of costs on an individual or on society 
will inevitably shift alongside changing circumstances. It is likewise nigh 
impossible to anticipate the secondary effects of a proposed policy, the 
                                                                                                                       
 
116 As listed above, the six defendant-specific factors are: (1) original arrest for a 
violent crime; (2) four or more prior arrests; (3) prior incarceration; (4) a prior failure to 
appear; (5) an active criminal justice status; and (6) aged nineteen or younger.   
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occurrence of which could change the outcome of the analysis significantly. 
Even monetizing direct costs and benefits is a potentially perilous endeavor 
given the sheer amount of the data available. But even if there was a way to 
conduct a perfect analysis, this Article does not ignore the inherent 
undemocratic nature of cost-benefit analysis and the potential pitfalls 
surrounding that. 
And indeed, nothing in this Article is intended to argue against the 
relative importance of constitutional rights or equity, fairness, and justice—
all arguments that pose valid critiques of cost-benefit analysis. Rather, this 
Article claims that, while no perfect solution exists, when implemented 
correctly, cost-benefit analysis can at least inform judicial decisionmaking 
in the pretrial process. And despite its empirical limitations, the cost-benefit 
analysis provided here could allow judges to release more defendants (while 
maintaining or lowering crime rates), and save this country a substantial 
amount of money.  
